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Abstract
We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
when wealth differences arise endogenously from unobservable savings or labor
supply decisions. The endogeneity of wealth implies that high risk individuals
may ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance
than low risks, a phenomenon that we refer to as irregular-crossing preferences.
In our model, both risk and patience (or productivity) are privately observable.
In contrast to the models in the existing literature, where wealth heterogeneity
is exogenously assumed, equilibria in our model no longer exhibit a monotone
relation between risk and coverage. Individuals who purchase larger coverage are
no longer higher risks, a phenomenon frequently observed in empirical studies.
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1 Introduction
In the standard screening model going back to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), indi-
viduals differ only in a single dimension, namely their risk of incurring a loss. In this
simple framework, equilibrium contracts are such that risk types are fully separated,
and high risk individuals obtain more insurance coverage than low risks. As shown by
Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006), this positive correlation between risk
and coverage is a robust property of equilibria in a much larger class of competitive
screening models, including extensions to heterogeneous preferences, moral hazard and
non-expected utility. It has therefore been the basis for much of the empirical research
trying to identify adverse selection in insurance markets. The evidence to support this
prediction, however, has been mixed, with many studies not being able to reject the null
hypothesis of zero correlation.1 Nevertheless, this cannot be interpreted as indicating
that there is no adverse selection in these markets. For instance, Finkelstein and Mc-
Garry (2006) show that preference based selection in the US long-term care insurance
market may offset risk based selection so that, in aggregate, those with more insurance
are not higher risks.
In this paper, we develop a novel theoretical explanation for the empirical results
based on endogenous wealth accumulation. We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz screening
model to a dynamic setting in which wealth levels are the result of optimal savings
or labor supply decisions. We show that, with endogenous wealth accumulation, high
risk individuals may ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for
insurance than low risk individuals, a phenomenon that we refer to as irregular-crossing
indifference curves. The reason is that, facing the same insurance contract, high risk
individuals ceteris paribus choose to supply more labor and to save more, which results
in a higher wealth level and thus lower risk aversion. If this effect is sufficiently strong,
it overcompensates the direct risk effect.
It turns out that the existence of irregular-crossing preferences, which cannot arise
in previously considered screening models, is crucial for characterizing the possible
equilibria in competitive insurance markets. Most importantly, for an economy with
two-dimensional heterogeneity in both risk and patience (or risk and productivity if
wealth differences arise from labor supply rather than savings), our central result shows
that equilibria can emerge in which those with more insurance coverage are not nec-
1See Cawley and Philipson (1999) for the US life insurance market, Chiappori and Salanié (2000)
and Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006) for the French automobile insurance market, and
Cardon and Hendel (2001) for the US health insurance market.
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essarily higher risks, which is consistent with much of the empirical evidence. The
intuition is that patient (or productive) individuals are willing to save (or work) more
in response to the risk they face and thus demand less insurance in equilibrium due to
their higher wealth and thus lower risk aversion.
Our paper contributes to a recent theoretical literature that attempts to derive and
explain empirically testable correlations in insurance markets. An important example is
the work by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié
(2006) mentioned above, which provides general conditions for a positive correlation
between insurance coverage and ex post risk. The assumption used to derive this prop-
erty in their model is that profits do not increase with coverage in the equilibrium set of
contracts (see Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006), p. 789). Although this
assumption may be satisfied in many competitive settings (especially when competition
drives down the profits of all contracts to zero in equilibrium), we show that it does
not necessarily hold in our model with multiple dimensions of private information and
endogenous wealth heterogeneity. Despite perfect competition, binding incentive con-
straints may prevent profitable contracts from being undercut, thus allowing for positive
profits in equilibrium.2 The violation of the non-increasing profits assumption is the
key reason why the logic of Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006) fails in our
model. More importantly, we are able to construct insurance market equilibria in which
there is no longer a perfect ordering between risk and coverage, without assuming any
of the ingredients considered as necessary by Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié
(2006), such as imperfect competition or fixed costs, biased beliefs of customers, or a
perfect correlation between risk and unobservable risk aversion.
Our model shares a common goal with other theoretical work that tries to explain
why insurance markets with adverse selection may not exhibit a positive correlation
between risk and insurance coverage. Most of this literature has focused on combining
adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance markets. In these models, individuals
can reduce their damage probability by an unobserved effort decision, which gives rise
to moral hazard. To introduce adverse selection, De Meza and Webb (2001) and Jullien,
Salanié, and Salanié (2007) assume that individuals differ in their privately known risk
attitude, which affects their effort decision.3 These models indeed generate equilibria
2In the empirical part of their paper, Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006) find strong
evidence against the validity of the non-increasing profits property in the data and interpret it as indi-
cating some sort of market power. Our model demonstrates that deviations from perfect competition
are not required to explain a failure of this property.
3This idea was first put forward informally by Hemenway (1990) and Hemenway (1992). Another
approach within this class of models, chosen by Stewart (1994) and Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997),
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where those with more insurance coverage do not have a higher ex post risk. They do
so, however, by making a number of additional assumptions. In particular, they depart
from the assumption of competitive markets. Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2007) con-
sider a monopolistic insurer and De Meza and Webb (2001) introduce costs that also
drive a wedge between premiums and expected claims. In contrast, our model gener-
ates the result in a perfectly competitive framework without introducing an additional
moral hazard problem and assumptions on insurers’ cost functions. More importantly,
the previous models stick to a framework with one-dimensional heterogeneity between
agents, where ex post risk and risk attitude are perfectly correlated.4 It remains an
open question whether their equilibria continue to exist in settings that allow for a less
restrictive structure of heterogeneity. Our results do not rely on a perfect correlation
between risk and risk aversion.
Our model is also related to theoretical contributions that extend the basic frame-
work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to two-dimensional heterogeneity. Such models
have been developed by Smart (2000), Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve (2003). They
assume that insurance customers differ in wealth and hence risk aversion in addition to
risk, whereby the correlation between risk and risk aversion is not assumed to be per-
fect. Countervailing incentives and thus deviations from usual risk separation emerge
if individuals differ in both characteristics so that the resulting effects work in opposite
directions. It is a central result of all these models, however, that risk and coverage are
perfectly ordered in equilibrium: the largest coverage contract purchased by any low
risk type still has a (weakly) smaller coverage than the smallest coverage contract pur-
chased by any high risk type. Our model differs conceptually from this literature as we
do not assume differences in wealth to be exogenous, but explicitly model their emer-
gence in a dynamic model. Our main result shows that the ordering of types obtained
in the models with exogenous wealth differences does not generalize to a more realistic
setting where heterogeneity in wealth and hence risk aversion arises endogenously from
unobservable savings or labor supply decisions, thus allowing us to generate equilibria
that are consistent with the empirical evidence.
is to assume that agents differ in their effort cost, which is also private information. While these
models yield some deviations from the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model, they have in common that
the correlation between ex post risk and insurance coverage will always be positive in equilibrium.
4De Meza and Webb (2001) assume that some individuals are risk-neutral and hence neither pur-
chase insurance nor take preventive actions. Their expected damage is therefore larger than that of
the individuals who purchase partial insurance and take preventive measures due to their higher risk
aversion. This generates a negative relationship between individuals’ risk and their insurance coverage.
Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2007) also consider a two-type model only. They are concerned with the
question how risk aversion affects the power of incentives provided by the optimal contract.
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Finally, at a technical level, our paper extends the work by Rochet and Chone (1998)
and Armstrong and Rochet (1999) on multidimensional screening to a situation with
competitive principals and non-quasilinear preferences of the agents. The interaction
of imperfect insurance markets with self-insurance in the form of saving and labor
supply leads to a situation with countervailing incentives in the sense of Lewis and
Sappington (1989). This is because the agents’ marginal willingness to pay for insurance
is influenced not only by their risk, but also their wealth level. Since savings and
labor supply and hence wealth levels react to uncertainty and hence depend on the
insurance market outcome, countervailing incentives arise endogenously in our model.
We demonstrate how the resulting interactions between labor, capital and insurance
markets affect insurers’ ability to screen their customers.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we show that the endogeneity of
wealth differences may give rise to irregular-crossing preferences. In section 3, we intro-
duce our model of the insurance market with two-dimensional heterogeneity and show
that it generates an empirically appealing equilibrium. Section 4 concludes. Several
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Preferences for Insurance with Endogenous Wealth
In this section, we develop a model to capture both a competitive insurance market
with asymmetric information and self-insurance in the form of wealth accumulation.
There are two major ways to do this. First, we may assume that individuals differ
in both their damage risk and their labor productivity, and choose their labor supply
endogenously. Insurance companies can neither observe individual risks, productivities,
nor hours of work. An alternative interpretation is to assume that individuals live for
two periods, save in the first period and face different damage risks in the second period.
A further dimension of heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that individuals differ
in their rate of time preference. Again, risks, savings and time preferences are private
information. Since both interpretations are completely equivalent, we choose the second
modelling strategy and provide comments on how to interpret our results in terms of
the first approach as we go along.
A second difference between our model and most of the screening literature starting
from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is that we conduct our analysis in the contract
space as opposed to the output (wealth) space. As we will demonstrate below, with
endogenous wealth accumulation, individual endowment points in the output space
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depend on the chosen insurance contract. This is because the income effects and the
level of uncertainty implied by insurance contracts affect optimal labor supply and
savings. Characterizing equilibria in the contract space circumvents this endogeneity
of endowment points and is therefore technically more convenient.
2.1 The Setup
To understand how individuals’ wealth accumulation decisions and their demand for
insurance interact, we consider a simple dynamic model with two periods t = 1, 2. There
is a continuum of individuals who are born at the beginning of period 1 with identical
endowments W1. Individuals consume in both periods with intertemporal preferences
given by u1(c1) + δiu2(c2), where δi ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor, and we assume ut(.),
t = 1, 2, to be continuous and increasing, and u2(.) to be weakly concave. Note that this
general formulation allows for different sub-utility functions for each period, including
u1(.) = u2(.) as a special case. There is a linear savings technology that allows agents to
transfer wealth from period 1 to period 2 at some exogenous rate of return R, which we
normalize to R = 1. We consider an economy of individuals who differ in their patience
δi, i = L,H, and their probability pj, j = L,H, of incurring a damage of size D in the
second period t = 2, with the conventions δL < δH and pL < pH . Let nij denote the
share of individuals with patience δi and risk pj. These individuals will be referred to
as ij−individuals.
2.2 Savings and Risk
In period t = 1, each type ij chooses an amount of savings sij = W1 − c1,ij, which
generates second period wealthW2,ij = sij. In the first period, individuals also purchase
insurance contracts that specify the share β ∈ [0, 1] of the damage that is covered, and
a premium d ∈ R+, both paid in period t = 2. Throughout the paper, the notation
A > B implies that insurance contract A has a larger coverage and a larger premium
than contract B. Given a contract C = (β, d) from the contract space C = [0, 1]×R+,
type ij’s optimal savings s∗ij solve the following program
max
sij∈[0,W1]
u1(W1 − sij) + δi[pju2(sij − (1− β)D − d) + (1− pj)u2(sij − d)]. (1)
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Let the solution be denoted by s∗ij(β, d) or, for simplicity, s∗ij(C) defined as
max
{
arg max
sij∈[0,W1]
u1(W1 − sij) + δi[pju2(sij − (1− β)D − d) + (1− pj)u2(sij − d)]
}
.
This assumes the largest savings level to be chosen in case of indifference. Our first
proposition provides conditions for this solution to exist, and characterizes the compar-
ative statics of optimal savings with respect to the risk type pj.
Proposition 1. s∗ij(C) as defined above exists and, at any given contract C ∈ C , weakly
increases in pj.
Proof. For notational simplicity, we suppress subscripts and define
F (s, p) ≡ u1(W1 − s) + δ (pu2(s− α1) + (1− p)u2(s− α2))
with α1 ≡ (1− β)D + d and α2 ≡ d ≤ α1. Then (1) and its solution can be written as
max
s∈S
F (s, p)
and
s∗(p) ≡ max{argmax
s∈S
F (s, p)}
with S ≡ [0,W1] and p ∈ P ≡ [0, 1]. To prove the proposition, we make use of the following theorem
due to Topkis (1998):
Lemma 1 (Topkis’ Theorem). Let s∗(p) be as defined above. Let S ⊂ R be compact and P be a
partially ordered set. If F : S × P → R is continuous in s and supermodular, then s∗(p) exists and is
weakly increasing.
Clearly, in our case, S = [0,W1] is compact, P = [0, 1] is a partially ordered set, and F (s, p) is
continuous by the assumption that u1 and u2 are continuous. Thus, to prove the proposition, we only
need to verify that F (s, p) is supermodular. Indeed, ∀s′, s′′ with s′ < s′′,
F (s′′, p)− F (s′, p) = u1(W1 − s′′)− u1(W1 − s′) + δ[u2(s′′ − α2)− u2(s′ − α2)
+p (u2(s′ − α2)− u2(s′ − α1)− (u2(s′′ − α2)− u2(s′′ − α1)))].
Since u2 is increasing and weakly concave by assumption, α1 ≥ α2, and s′′ > s′,
u2(s′ − α2)− u2(s′ − α1)− (u2(s′′ − α2)− u2(s′′ − α1)) ≥ 0,
and thus F (s′′, p)− F (s′, p) is indeed weakly increasing in p. F (s, p) is therefore supermodular, com-
pleting the proof.
Proposition 1 shows that, due to risk aversion in the second period, high risk indi-
viduals save more than low risks given the same insurance contract. The proof makes
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use of monotone comparative static methods based on the supermodularity of expected
utility (as given by equation (1)) in savings s and the damage risk p, which allow us to
establish the result under our very general conditions (notably, no particular assump-
tions on the form of the first period utility function u1, nor differentiability conditions
are required).5
This positive effect of risk on savings (and hence accumulated wealth), holding
fixed an insurance contract, is well documented empirically. The most direct evidence
is provided in Engen and Gruber (1995), who use exogenous variation in unemployment
insurance across states and time in the US to study the effect of insurance coverage and
unemployment risk on financial wealth. While their main interest is in the precautionary
savings effect (which predicts that individuals with less insurance coverage save more,
controlling for their risk type), they also do an extension exercise that is of interest for
our purpose. To test whether the size of the precautionary savings effect increases with
risk, they estimate the regression equation
wealth = α + β1insurance+ β2risk+ β3insurance× risk+ γX + ε,
where X includes various controls and risk is a location-specific measure of the prob-
ability of being unemployed (equation 5 in Engen and Gruber (1995)). While they
are concerned primarily about the precautionary savings effect β1 and the interaction
coefficient β3, the effect characterized in Proposition 1, which describes how risk affects
wealth, controlling for the insurance contract, is captured by β2. Indeed, table 7 in En-
gen and Gruber (1995) shows that local unemployment risk has a significantly positive
effect on net assets, and a positive but insignificant effect on gross assets.6
2.3 Irregular-Crossing Preferences
We now proceed to show how the endogeneity of wealth demonstrated in the preceding
subsection affects an individual’s willingness to pay for insurance. Substituting the
optimal savings s∗ij(β, d) into the expected utility function yields the indirect utility
function Vij(β, d) or Vij(C), which is continuous by Berge’s maximum theorem, in-
5Using the same methods as in the proof of Proposition 1, it could be immediately shown that
s∗ij(C) is also weakly increasing in the patience δi, but this result is less important for our following
analysis.
6Similar evidence is available in other settings, for instance annuity markets, where individuals with
a higher life-expectancy (which corresponds to a higher risk type) tend to accumulate more wealth,
controlling for the degree of annuitization (see e.g. Brown (2001)). Brown and Finkelstein (2009)
provide related evidence for long-term care insurance markets.
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creasing in β and decreasing in d. Thus indifference curves in C and marginal rates
of substitution can be obtained from Vij, where it is important to notice that optimal
savings will adjust as we move along an individual’s indifference curve. Consider the
following example.
Example 1 (Differentiable Utility). Assume that both u1 and u2 are continuously differ-
entiable and strictly concave. Then, the necessary and sufficient condition for expected
utility maximization (assuming that (1) has an interior solution) becomes
u′1(W1 − s∗ij) = δi [pju′2(s∗ij − (1− β)D − d) + (1− pj)u′2(s∗ij − d)]. (2)
(2) is a standard Euler equation stating that savings s∗ij(β, d) are determined so as to
equalize expected discounted marginal utility across periods. Denote second period
consumption in case of loss by c02,ij = s∗ij − (1− β)D − d and c12,ij = s∗ij − d otherwise.
Then, the slope of an indifference curve of an individual with patience δi and risk pj in
contract (β, d) becomes,
MRSij(β, d) =
dd
dβ
∣∣∣∣
Vij=V¯
=
Dpju
′
2(c
0
2,ij)
pju′2(c
0
2,ij) + (1− pj)u′2(c12,ij)
> 0. (3)
For the differentiable model, we can use (3) to examine the crossing properties
of different individuals’ indifference curves at a given insurance contract, which are
crucial for equilibrium outcomes. Let us first ignore differences in patience and consider
individuals that only differ in their risk. In the standard adverse selection model where
wealth is exogenous, high risks have a steeper indifference curve than low risks at any
given contract. Put formally, the marginal rate of substitution between coverage and
premium given in (3) is increasing in pj. Clearly, the property immediately follows from
(3) if savings are held fixed at the same level for all types. In that case, c02,ij and c12,ij
do not depend on type and (3) is increasing in damage probability. By the following
definition, we refer to this as “regular-crossing” of indifference curves.
Definition 1. The indifference curves of two individuals that differ only in risk exhibit
“regular-crossing” at a contract (β, d) if MRSiL(β, d) < MRSiH(β, d). Otherwise, they
exhibit “irregular-crossing”.
Definition 1 introduces a local concept at a given contract. If regular-crossing holds
in the whole contract space C , as it does in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, it implies
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the global property of single crossing for indifference curves of two individuals that dif-
fer only in risk, which is crucial for determining equilibria in standard models. When
savings are endogenous, however, this property does not necessarily hold. Savings vary
with risk according to Proposition 1, with larger risks saving more. Then, if u2 exhibits
decreasing risk-aversion, high risks are less risk-averse, which ceteris paribus reduces
their marginal rate of substitution (3). If this effect is strong enough, a high risk’s
indifference curve can be flatter than a low risk’s, i.e. irregular-crossing can occur.7
We proceed to explicitly demonstrate this possibility in a second example, based on
stepwise linear utility functions. This setup allows us to derive optimal savings, in-
direct utility and indifference curves in closed form and thus to derive the underlying
mechanism most transparently. In section 3, we will then use Example 2 to explicitly
construct an equilibrium with empirically relevant properties.8
Example 2 (Stepwise Linear Utility). Utility in period 1 is given by
u1(c) =

α3c+ (α1 − α2)c˜1 + (α2 − α3)c˜2 if c˜2 < c
α2c+ (α1 − α2)c˜1 if c˜1 < c ≤ c˜2
α1c if c ≤ c˜1,
where c˜1 < c˜2 and αi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3. Utility in period 2 is given by
u2(c) =

γ3c+ (γ1 − γ2)c¯1 + (γ2 − γ3)c¯2 if c¯2 < c
γ2c+ (γ1 − γ2)c¯1 if c¯1 < c ≤ c¯2
γ1c if c ≤ c¯1,
where c¯1 < c¯2 and 0 < γ3 < γ2 < γ1. These utility functions satisfy all our previous
assumptions. We further assume w.l.o.g. that δH = 1. The model is then completely
specified by a collection of parameters
P = ((αk, γk)k=1,2,3, (c¯k, , c˜k)k=1,2, nLL, nHL, nLH , nHH , δL, pL, pH , D) .
7In the labor supply model, this would correspond to high risks working more than low risks. The
resulting higher labor income reduces risk aversion, which can lead to irregular-crossing.
8The possibility of irregular-crossing could also be illustrated within a simpler example with utility
functions that consist of only two linear segments and thus one kink. The more general structure
of Example 2, where preferences have two kinks, however, is needed for our equilibrium construction
in section 3, which is why we introduce it here already. In general, the kinked utility functions are
used for analytical convenience only, and should be thought of as an approximation for a differentiable
model.
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The complete analysis of the model can be found in Appendix A. There, we identify
the following set of conditions under which the model is most easily tractable:
Assumption 1. The parameter collection P satisfies
(i) α1 < α2 < α3,
(ii) c¯2 − c¯1 > D,
(iii) pHγ1 + (1− pH)γ2 < α3 < δLγ1,
(iv) pHγ2 + (1− pH)γ3 < α2 < δLγ2, and
(v) γ3 < α1 < pLδLγ2 + (1− pL)δLγ3.
Let P denote the set of parameter collections P that satisfy Assumption 1, which
is shown to be nonempty in Appendix A. As we also show there, Assumption 1 implies
that, in any contract (β, d) and for all four types, there are only three savings levels
that could potentially be optimal: s1 = c¯1+ d, s2 = c¯2+ d, and s3 = c¯2+ d+ (1− β)D,
with s1 ≤ s2 ≤ s3. Different types might, however, find a different choice among
sk, k = 1, 2, 3, optimal in contract (β, d). To determine s∗ij(β, d), we only need to
compare the premium d to three threshold values
d12ij (β), d
23
ij (β) and d
13
ij (β),
which are given by equations (11) - (13) in the Appendix. If, for example, d < d12ij (β),
then type ij prefers s1 over s2, while s2 yields a larger utility than s1 for ij if d ≥ d12ij (β).
Type ij’s preference between the remaining two pairs of potentially optimal savings are
computed analogously using d23ij (β) and d13ij (β), and the globally optimal savings level
can easily be determined. Specifically, since d ≥ dkmij (β), k ∈ {1, 2}, m > k, always
implies that the larger savings sm are preferred over the smaller sk, s∗ij(β, d) is weakly
increasing in the premium d.
As predicted by Proposition 1, we show in the Appendix that the three critical values
d12ij (β), d23ij (β) and d13ij (β) are all decreasing in individual damage risk, and strictly so
for contracts with less than full coverage (β < 1). Thus savings are (weakly) increasing
in risk: if we fix a contract (β, d) with β < 1 and increase an individual’s damage
probability, the critical values will eventually fall below d and savings will jump upwards.
The marginal rate of substitution MRSij(β, d) then depends on whether s1, s2 or s3
is optimal for ij in (β, d). For example, if s∗ij(β, d) = s1, we obtain (see Appendix A for
the derivations)
MRSij(β) = MRS
1
ij(β) ≡
δiγ1
α3
pjD. (4)
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The marginal rates resulting from the other two savings levels are
MRS2ij(β, d) =
δiγ2
α2
pjD (5)
and
MRS3ij(β, d) =
(
1− (1− pj)δiγ3
α1
)
D. (6)
Closer inspection of (4) - (6) reveals our main insight concerning irregular-crossing.
First, each of the expressions is strictly increasing in damage probability p. Thus,
whenever two types iL and iH that differ only in risk find the same level of savings
optimal in a contract (β, d), regular-crossing holds. Translated to a differentiable model,
this corresponds to a case where the high risk does not save much more than the
low risk, so that the standard risk effect dominates. If the two individuals differ in
both risk and patience, any of them can of course have the steeper indifference curve,
because the marginal rate is affected by both pj and δi. This corresponds to a standard
case of countervailing incentives due to exogenous two-dimensional heterogeneity, as
in Smart (2000). Given our arguments from above, however, it is now also possible
that iL prefers a smaller level of savings than iH in (β, d). Suppose, for example,
that s∗iL(β, d) = s1 and s∗iH(β, d) = s2 because d12iH(β) < d < d12iL(β), which is possible
since d12iH(β) < d12iL(β). We then need to compare (4) to (5) and find irregular-crossing
MRS2iH(β, d) ≤ MRS1iL(β, d) if
pL
γ1
γ2
≥ pH α3
α2
,
which can be satisfied in addition to Assumption 1. Figure 1 illustrates this case. It
depicts the contract space together with the zero-profit lines for the two risks (dotted
lines). The regime switching lines d12iL(β) and d12iH(β) are also depicted, with a contract
C that lies in between them and in which irregular-crossing occurs. Translated into
a model with differentiable utility, this corresponds to the case where the high risk
saves sufficiently more than the low risk to have a lower marginal rate of substitution.
Proceeding similarly, conditions (20) and (21) in the Appendix imply irregular-crossing
if s∗iL(β) = s1, s∗iH(β) = s3 or s∗iL(β) = s2, s∗iH(β) = s3, respectively.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we aim at exploring the implications of irregular-crossing preferences,
which cannot arise in models of adverse selection in insurance markets considered pre-
11
Figure 1: Irregular-Crossing.
viously, for the set of screening equilibria in our model.
3.1 Equilibrium Definition
In line with much of the insurance literature, we use the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium
concept, which is directly based on the contracts that are offered by the firms. This
equilibrium can be thought of as arising in a game with an additional period t = 0 in
which risk-neutral insurance companies can each offer one contract (β, d) ∈ C .9 The
expected profit of such a contract if it is subsequently purchased by a of the low-risk
and b of the high-risk individuals is given by
pi(β, d, a, b) = a[d− pLβD] + b[d− pHβD]. (7)
For any finite set C ′ = {C1, ..., CN} ⊂ C of contracts, where Ck = (βk, dk), let piC ′(Ck)
be the profit of contract Ck if all individuals choose their preferred contract from C ′
(together with their simultaneously determined optimal savings). In case of indifference,
9See, for example, Netzer and Scheuer (2009) for a new approach to modelling insurance markets
with adverse selection game-theoretically. The Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts can be the equilibrium
outcome in their setting. Recent work by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) and Bisin and Gottardi (2006)
has shown that Rothschild-Stiglitz type equilibria can also be generated by competitive equilibrium
models rather than the original game-theoretic setup.
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we assume the contract with larger coverage to be chosen. We then define an equilibrium
as follows:
Definition 2. The set of contracts C ′ is an equilibrium if
(i) piC ′(Ck) ≥ 0 ∀Ck ∈ C ′, and
(ii) @C ∈ C \C ′ with piC ′∪{C}(C) > 0.
The definition goes back to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In their model, all
equilibrium contracts must earn zero profits. Already in the two-dimensional model of
Smart (2000), and also in our model with endogenous wealth, equilibrium contracts can
earn strictly positive profits. Competition does not eliminate such contracts, because
any contract that is slightly more attractive to the consumers would also attract bad
risk types and become unprofitable. As a result, the non-increasing profits property of
Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006) can be violated in our model, which, as
we will demonstrate in the following, allows for equilibria with an imperfect ordering
of risk and coverage.10
Before we move to the equilibrium construction in the next section, it needs to be
emphasized that we actually need two dimensions of unobservable heterogeneity (in risk
and patience / productivity) to obtain this main result. Even with endogenous wealth
accumulation, low risk individuals will never purchase more coverage than high risks in
any equilibrium of a model with one-dimensional heterogeneity in risk only. In Appendix
B, this claim is stated and proven formally for the very general setup introduced in
Section 2. Intuitively, the countervailing incentives arising from endogenous wealth
accumulation need to be reinforced by patience differences to reverse the usual ordering
of risk and coverage in equilibrium. We therefore move to a richer (and more realistic)
model with multidimensional heterogeneity. However, because exogenous heterogeneity
in wealth only generates equilibria with a positive correlation of risk and coverage (as
shown by Smart 2000, Wambach 2000 and Villeneuve 2003), endogeneity is still the
crucial ingredient that drives our result.
3.2 Equilibrium with Imperfect Ordering of Risk and Coverage
In this section, we explicitly construct an equilibrium to illustrate our main point. In the
next section, we discuss the plausibility of this equilibrium, in particular with respect
10See Smart (2000) for a way to reconcile positive profits with possibly unlimited entry by new firms,
based on strictly positive but vanishing entry costs. De Meza and Webb (2001) propose an additional
approach to deal with potential problems from positive profits in perfect competition.
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to its empirical predictions beyond the non-monotone ordering of risk and coverage.
However, we do not attempt a full characterization of all possible equilibria in the two-
dimensional framework. Such a task would be associated with substantial complications
in our very general model. For example, separating or pooling equilibria as those
identified by Smart (2000) could also exist in our model.
Indeed, our construction builds on Smart (2000), who presents a pooling equilibrium
in which individuals with high risk and high risk-aversion (corresponding to our type LH
with low patience and high risk) obtain an actuarially fair contract with full coverage,
and individuals with high risk / low risk-aversion and low risk / high risk-aversion
(corresponding to our types HH and LL) are pooled in a contract with partial coverage
(p. 162). The individuals with low risk and low risk aversion (our type HL) cannot be
part of the pool, because they could always be attracted to a contract offer with smaller
coverage and premium, due to regular-crossing. Hence they must obtain a contract with
smaller coverage than the pool in equilibrium, which establishes the positive correlation
property.
Our equilibrium is similar in that the LH type also obtains the fair full coverage
contract and that there will be a pooling contract purchased by two different risk types.
Irregular-crossing between the LH and the LL type in this pooling contract, however,
now implies that the LL (not HL) type can be attracted away from the pool by a
contract with larger coverage and premium, because this type saves little and is very
risk-averse. In the equilibrium, the LL type obtains more coverage than the pool of the
HH and HL types, which breaks the monotone ordering logic. Consider the preferences
given in Example 2. The above argument translates into the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let C ′ = {C1, C2, C3} ⊂ C be given by
C1 = (1, pHD),
C2 = argmax(β,d)∈C VHL(β, d) s.t. (i) VLH(C1) = VLH(β, d),
(ii) pi(β, d, nHL, nHH) ≥ 0,
C3 = argmax(β,d)∈C VLL(β, d) s.t. (i) VLH(C1) = VLH(β, d).
Then, there exists a nonempty open subset P ′ ⊂P such that, for all P ∈P ′, it holds
that C2 < C3 and C ′ is an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C (Section 5.2).
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2. Type LH prefers contract C1, types HL
and HH prefer C2, and LL prefers C3. It can be seen from the figure that (i) the con-
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Figure 2: Equilibrium.
tracts C1, C2 and C3 all earn non-negative profits (specifically, C3 earns strictly positive
profits), and (ii) there is no contract outside of {C1, C2, C3} that would attract low risks
only and therefore earn positive profits for sure. Clearly, contracts offered in addition
to {C1, C2, C3} would attract different subgroups of the population, according to their
specific location. But these subgroups will necessarily include large risks and no devi-
ation is profitable for an appropriate composition of the population. The assumptions
assuring this are a multi-dimensional generalization of the Rothschild-Stiglitz existence
condition that requires that there are not too many low risks. See Appendix C for a
complete specification of the existence conditions in our framework.
Most important is the fact that C3, purchased by low risks that are impatient,
has a larger coverage than the pooling contract C2, which is purchased by patient
high risks. Hence there is no longer the perfect ordering of risk and coverage that
the models with exogenous heterogeneity predict. As Figure 2 makes clear, the non-
increasing profits assumption by Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006) is not
satisfied in the equilibrium of Proposition 2. In fact, C3 will always make more profits
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per capita than C2 although C3 > C2, since it is only bought by low risks. Thus,
the non-increasing profits property cannot be considered as a general characteristic of
equilibrium in competitive insurance markets as soon as multidimensional heterogeneity
and unobserved actions such as labor supply or savings are accounted for. Its violation
is the key reason why the argument by Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006)
does not apply in our framework.
3.3 Evidence on the Underlying Mechanism
The equilibrium is consistent with the empirical evidence that a monotone relation
between risk and coverage is not observed although adverse selection seems to be a
relevant phenomenon in insurance markets. Technically, it is the possibility of irregular-
crossing preferences which is crucial for generating such equilibria. Notably, deviations
from perfect competition are not necessary to obtain the result.
On the other hand, however, our model predicts that there should again be a posi-
tive correlation between risk and coverage when conditioning on income/wealth or on
more direct measures of the second dimension of private information, i.e. patience and
productivity. This pattern of (conditional) correlations is empirically well-supported.
Notably, Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) consider the US Medigap market (a mar-
ket for supplemental private health insurance covering spending excluded by Medicare),
and first show that there is a significantly negative correlation between risk and coverage
on average (table 2, panel A in their paper). The corresponding regression is
coverage = α + β1risk+ β2D + ε,
where risk is measured by total medical expenditure and D are variables known to
insurers and used to price contracts (equation 6 in their paper). β1 is indeed significantly
negative (Table 6 rows 1 and 9). The authors then investigate the sources of this
negative correlation by considering various conditional correlations. This is done by
estimating the regression equation
coverage = α+ β1risk+ β2D + β3X + ε,
where X are now variables that measure the second dimension of private information
(i.e. income/wealth or productivity/patience in our framework). Specifically, they in-
clude measures of an individual’s risk aversion, income, education and cognitive ability,
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which relate to productivity, and longevity expectation and financial planning horizon,
which capture patience (see equation 7 and table 6 in their paper). The authors add
more and more of the above-mentioned variables in X and show that the originally
negative (unconditional) correlation β1 becomes a more and more positive conditional
correlation (table 6 rows 2-8 and 10-16).11
4 Conclusion
Based on recent empirical findings, the theoretical literature on adverse selection has
started to realize that screening in most relevant real-world situations is associated
with more than one dimension of privately known heterogeneity, and that the result-
ing countervailing incentives significantly alter the nature of equilibrium compared to
the standard model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). These models typically assume
that all dimensions of heterogeneity are given exogenously, and they predict a posi-
tive correlation between risk occurrence and insurance coverage in equilibrium. This is
contradicted by empirical studies which mostly observe a zero or negative correlation.
In this paper, we asked the question how insurance market equilibrium looks like
if heterogeneity in some dimensions is not given exogenously but arises from the in-
dividuals’ choices. As a natural example of such a situation, we considered a model
where individuals not only differ in risk and select an insurance contract, but also
choose their savings or labor supply endogenously, which affects their wealth and hence
risk attitude. This allows for irregular-crossing of preferences in the sense that, among
individuals who exogenously only differ in risk, high risk individuals have the lower
marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks since they save more or supply
more labor and hence are less risk averse.
We show that this can lead to equilibria with positive profit contracts that violate the
non-increasing profits property of Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006), and
therefore exhibit a non-monotone relation between risk and coverage. Interestingly, this
latter result provides an explanation for the empirical findings without assuming non-
competitive insurance markets or imposing restrictions on the structure of heterogeneity.
In addition, the model predicts that the correlation between risk and coverage should
11Finkelstein and McGarry (2003) also provide related evidence for the market for the long-term care
insurance. They also find an overall negative correlation between risk and coverage (their equation 2
and table 4, column 1). This also holds when controlling for variables that insurers use for pricing,
notably age (columns 2 and 4). However, when they control for income quartile and asset quartile in
addition to age (see p. 17 and table 3 in their paper), it turns out that the originally significantly
negative correlation then first vanishes and becomes positive (see column 3 of table 4 in their paper).
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turn positive when conditioning on the second dimension of heterogeneity, which is also
well-documented empirically.
Our model raises a number of issues for further research. First, our informational
assumption that risk, patience and savings are privately known by the individuals may
make our model a helpful tool for the analysis of policy questions such as taxation under
risk. Models addressing these issues need to combine multidimensional heterogeneity
with the endogenous choice of private insurance and wealth.12 Natural questions to ask
are about the effects of taxes or social insurance in this framework, and, more generally,
about the efficiency properties of the equilibria that arise in our model. While the effi-
ciency properties of equilibria with one-dimensional private information have received
much attention,13 little is known about the existence of Pareto-improving policies in
multidimensional screening models.
Furthermore, as pointed out above, the possibility of irregular-crossing is the driv-
ing force behind our novel results. Our model is just one - though certainly natural -
example of a situation where irregular-crossing can arise. The results extend, however,
to other settings. Generally, irregular-crossing preferences can result from some unob-
served decision that does not affect the agent’s risk but risk aversion. This may not
only be relevant in models of insurance, but also of credit markets, portfolio choice, or
labor contracts.
References
Armstrong, M., and J.-C. Rochet (1999): “Multidimensional Screening: A User’s
Guide,” European Economic Review, 43, 959–979.
Bisin, A., and P. Gottardi (2006): “Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse
Selection,” Journal of Political Economy, 114, 485–516.
Boadway, R., M. Leite-Monteiro, M. Marchand, and P. Pestieau (2006):
“Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection,”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108, 279–298.
Brown, J. R. (2001): “Private Pensions, Mortality Risk, and the Decision to Annu-
itize,” Journal of Public Economics, 82, 29–62.
12For recent studies in this direction, but typically with a more restrictive treatment of multidimen-
sional heterogeneity than in the present paper, see Boadway, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau
(2006), Netzer and Scheuer (2007) and Chetty and Saez (2008).
13See, for instance, Wilson (1977), Crocker and Snow (1985), Hellwig (1987) and Gale (1996).
18
Brown, J. R., and A. N. Finkelstein (2009): “The Private Market for Long-Term
Care Insurance in the United States: A Review of the Evidence,” Journal of Risk
and Insurance, 76, 5–29.
Cardon, J., and I. Hendel (2001): “Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance:
Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey,” RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 32, 408–427.
Cawley, J., and T. Philipson (1999): “An Empirical Examination of Information
Barriers to Trade in Insurance,” American Economic Review, 89, 827–846.
Chassagnon, A., and P. Chiappori (1997): “Insurance under Moral Hazard and Ad-
verse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition,” Discussion Paper, DELTA, Paris.
Chetty, R., and E. Saez (2008): “Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with
Endogenous Private Insurance,” NBER Working Paper No. 14403.
Chiappori, P., B. Jullien, B. Salanié, and F. Salanié (2006): “Asymmetric
Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications,” RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, forthcoming.
Chiappori, P., and B. Salanié (2000): “Testing for Asymmetric Information in
Insurance Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 108, 56–78.
Crocker, K., and A. Snow (1985): “The Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria in
Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information,” Journal of Public Economics, 26,
207–219.
De Meza, D., and D. Webb (2001): “Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets,”
RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 249–262.
Dubey, P., and J. Geanakoplos (2002): “Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz
Reconsidered,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1529–1570.
Engen, E. M., and J. Gruber (1995): “Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary
Saving,” NBER Working Paper 5252.
Fang, H., M. P. Keane, and D. Silverman (2008): “Sources of Advantageous Selec-
tion: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market,” Journal of Political Economy,
116, 303–350.
19
Finkelstein, A., and K. McGarry (2003): “Private Information and its Effect
on Market Equilibrium: New Evidence from Long-term Care Insurance,” NBER
Working Paper 9957.
(2006): “Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-
term Care Insurance Market,” American Economic Review, 96, 938–958.
Gale, D. (1996): “Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Selection,”
Economic Theory, 7, 207–235.
Hellwig, M. (1987): “Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Competition in
Markets with Adverse Selection,” European Economic Review, 31, 319–325.
Hemenway, D. (1990): “Propitious Selection,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105,
1063–1069.
(1992): “Propitious Selection in Insurance Markets,” Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 5, 247–251.
Jullien, B., B. Salanié, and F. Salanié (2007): “Screening Risk-Averse Agents
under Moral Hazard: Single-Crossing and the CARA Case,” Economic Theory, 30,
151–169.
Lewis, T., and D. Sappington (1989): “Countervailing incentives in agency prob-
lems,” Journal of Economic Theory, 49, 294–313.
Netzer, N., and F. Scheuer (2007): “Taxation, Insurance and Precautionary La-
bor,” Journal of Public Economics, 91, 1519–1531.
(2009): “Competitive Markets Without Commitment,” SOI Discussion Paper
No. 0814.
Rochet, J.-C., and P. Chone (1998): “Ironing, Sweeping and Multidimensional
Screening,” Econometrica, 66, 783–826.
Rothschild, M., and J. Stiglitz (1976): “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Incomplete Information,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 90, 629–649.
Smart, M. (2000): “Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables,” Inter-
national Economic Review, 41, 153–169.
20
Stewart, J. (1994): “The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
in Competitive Insurance Markets,” Economic Inquiry, 32, 193–208.
Topkis, D. (1998): Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, USA.
Villeneuve, B. (2003): “Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionelle en assur-
ance,” Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 69, 119–142.
Wambach, A. (2000): “Introducing Heterogeneity in the Rothschild-Stiglitz Model,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 67, 579–592.
Wilson, C. (1977): “A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 12, 167–207.
5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix A: Proofs for Example 2 (irregular-crossing)
5.1.1 Utility and Savings
Fix a contract (β, d) ∈ C . We are interested in the optimal savings s∗ij(β, d) of type ij when preferences
are given as in Example 2. First, the maximization problem (1) can be rewritten as
max
sij
δi[pju2(sij − (1− β)D − d) + (1− pj)u2(sij − d)]− [−u1(W1 − sij)],
i.e. as the maximization of the difference between expected discounted utility from period 2 and the
negative of utility in period 1. This problem is illustrated in Figure 3, for the two types HL and HH.
The lower dashed line (long dashes) represents −u1(W1−s), shifted upwards for graphical convenience,
as a function of savings s. The slopes of −u1(W1 − s) are indicated in the figure (α1, α2 and α3). The
other two lines represent the expected period 2 utility for the low risk (upper dashed line, short dashes)
and the high risk type (solid line), respectively. Slopes are again given in the figure.
Several additional assumptions are implicit in Figure 3. First, α1 < α2 < α3 holds. Second, it is
assumed that c¯1 + d + (1 − β)D < c¯2 + d. This holds for every contract (β, d) if c¯2 − c¯1 > D. Under
this assumption, the kinks of the expected period 2 utility functions are always ranked as depicted in
the graph.14 The figure finally reflects the following three assumptions:
(i) pHγ1 + (1− pH)γ2 < α3 < γ1,
(ii) pHγ2 + (1− pH)γ3 < α2 < γ2, and
14Fixing a coverage β, varying the premium d then simply amounts to shifting the period 2 utility
functions, or, more easily, the function −u1(W1 − s) left or right.
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Figure 3: Optimal Savings of Patient Individuals in Contract (β, d).
(iii) γ3 < α1 < pLγ2 + (1− pL)γ3.
For example, property (i) implies that the first segment of −u1(W1 − s) is flatter (with a slope of α3)
than the initial segment of both types’ period 2 expected utility function (with a slope of γ1), but
steeper than their second segment (again for both types), which has the slopes pLγ1 + (1− pL)γ2 and
pHγ1 + (1− pH)γ2, respectively. Properties (ii) and (iii) are analogous for the remaining segments.15
Altogether, they imply that there are only three candidates for optimal savings at a contract (β, d),
for both HH and HL: s1 = c¯1 + d, s2 = c¯2 + d, and s3 = c¯2 + d+ (1− β)D, where s1 ≤ s2 ≤ s3.
This argument applies to all four types simultaneously (not only to HH and HL) whenever con-
ditions equivalent to (i)-(iii) are also satisfied for the low patient types. These modified conditions are
obtained from (i)-(iii) by replacing any γi by δLγi, for i = 1, 2, 3. It is actually possible to satisfy the
original and the modified conditions simultaneously, because the latter are automatically satisfied if
the former are, for sufficiently large δL < 1. We now summarize all these assumptions as follows:
Assumption A1.
(i) α1 < α2 < α3,
(ii) c¯2 − c¯1 > D,
(iii) pHγ1 + (1− pH)γ2 < α3 < δLγ1,
(iv) pHγ2 + (1− pH)γ3 < α2 < δLγ2, and
15Taking these and the previous assumptions together implies that γ3 < α1 < α2 < γ2 < α3 < γ1.
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(v) γ3 < α1 < pLδLγ2 + (1− pL)δLγ3.
From Figure 3 it is also possible to see that s1 can only be optimal if s1 = c¯1 + d < W1 − c˜2.
Otherwise, increasing s from s1 would increase the distance between expected period 2 utility and
−u1. Similarly, s2 can only be optimal if W1 − c˜2 < s2 < W1 − c˜1, and s3 can only be optimal if
s3 > W1 − c˜1. This now allows us to compute the overall (lifetime) utilities from the three candidate
savings as follows:
Uij(s1) = α3[W1 − c¯1 − d] + (α1 − α2)c˜1 + (α2 − α3)c˜2 + δiγ1c¯1 − pjδiγ1(1− β)D, (8)
Uij(s2) = α2[W1 − c¯2 − d] + (α1 − α2)c˜1 + δi(γ1 − γ2)c¯1 + δiγ2c¯2 − pjδiγ2(1− β)D, (9)
Uij(s3) = α1[W1 − c¯2 − d− (1− β)D] + δi(γ1 − γ2)c¯1 + δiγ2c¯2 + δiγ3(1− pj)(1− β)D. (10)
5.1.2 Savings Regimes
Comparing the utility levels (8) - (10) pairwise, we can derive lines that separate the areas of the
contract space in which one savings level yields a greater utility level than the other, for a type ij.
First, a comparison between Uij(s1) and Uij(s2) yields the regime border
d12ij (β) ≡W1 − c˜2 −
(
(α3 − δiγ2)c¯1 + (δiγ2 − α2)c¯2
α3 − α2
)
− δi
(
γ1 − γ2
α3 − α2
)
pj(1− β)D, (11)
so that Uij(s1) > Uij(s2) if d < d12ij (β) and vice versa. Analogously, comparing s2 to s3 yields
d23ij (β) ≡W1 − c˜1 − c¯2 −
(
pjδiγ2 + (1− pj)δiγ3 − α1
α2 − α1
)
(1− β)D, (12)
where s2 is preferred over s3 if d < d23ij (β). Finally, we obtain
d13ij (β) ≡ W1 −
(
(α3 − δiγ2)c¯1 + (α2 − α1)c˜1 + (δiγ2 − α1)c¯2 + (α3 − α2)c˜2
α3 − α1
)
−
(
pjδiγ1 + (1− pj)δiγ3 − α1
α3 − α1
)
(1− β)D, (13)
where s1 is preferred over s3 when d < d13ij (β).
For any given parameter constellation satisfying Assumption A1, the optimal savings of type ij in
a contract can now be determined by comparing the location of the contract relative to the (linear)
regime borders d12ij , d23ij and d13ij . First, fix the coverage β. Due to transitivity of preferences, it must
be true that either d12ij (β) ≤ d13ij (β) ≤ d23ij (β) or d23ij (β) ≤ d13ij (β) ≤ d12ij (β). In the first case, we obtain
s∗ij(β, d) =

s3 if d23ij (β) ≤ d,
s2 if d12ij (β) ≤ d < d23ij (β),
s1 if d < d12ij (β),
(14)
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i.e. the regime border d13ij can be ignored when determining optimal savings.16 In the second case we
have
s∗ij(β, d) =
{
s3 if d13ij (β) ≤ d,
s1 if d < d13ij (β),
(15)
i.e. only the regime border d13ij is relevant and s2 is never optimal. Observe that, in any case, s∗ij is
weakly increasing in the premium d.
5.1.3 Marginal Rates of Substitution
We now derive the marginal rates of substitution between coverage and premium for type ij. These
rates exist except for contracts on one of the regime borders, where the indifference curves are not
differentiable but kinked. We have to distinguish three cases, according to the optimal savings level in
a contract (β, d). For s∗ij(β, d) = s1 we obtain from the above formulation (8) of Uij(s1) that
MRS1ij(β, d) =
δiγ1
α3
pjD. (16)
Analogously, we have
MRS2ij(β, d) =
δiγ2
α2
pjD (17)
and
MRS3ij(β, d) =
(
1− (1− pj)δiγ3
α1
)
D. (18)
When comparing the marginal rates of substitution at some contract (β, d) of two individuals that
differ only in risk, two possible cases can occur. First, both individuals might find the same savings
regime optimal and hence save the same amount s1, s2 or s3. Then, because the three expressions (16)
- (18) are each strictly increasing in damage probability, the larger risk has the steeper indifference
curve. This is the standard regular-crossing result for the case where different risk types save the same
amount and exhibit the same risk-aversion.
It is also possible, however, that two individuals that differ only in risk find different savings levels
optimal in the same contract. To see this, examine the regime switching borders (11) - (13) in greater
detail. For a fixed coverage β < 1, and under Assumption A1, the values d12ij (β), d23ij (β) and d13ij (β)
are all strictly decreasing in damage probability. This implies that a large risk individual will jump to
a larger level of savings already for smaller premiums d, according to (14) and (15). There are thus
contracts in which a high risk saves more than a low risk but not reversely (which is exactly what
Proposition 1 demonstrates at a greater level of generality).
In fact, an increase in damage probability amounts to a counter-clockwise rotation of the regime
switching borders around their value for β = 1, which is independent of risk. This is exemplified in
Figure 1 for d12iH and d
12
iL. Then, if C = (β, d) is such that d
12
iH(β) < d < d
12
iL(β), we need to compare
MRS1iL(β, d) to MRS
2
iH(β, d). Irregular-crossing (MRS
1
iL ≥ MRS2iH) occurs if
pL
γ1
γ2
≥ pH α3
α2
. (19)
16Specifically, this implies that d13ij can always be ignored whenever d12ij lies below d23ij in the whole
contract space.
24
Analogously, irregular-crossing can occur if type iL saves s1 but type iH saves s3 in the same contract.
The corresponding condition becomes
δi
(
pL
γ1
α3
+ (1− pH) γ3
α1
)
≥ 1. (20)
Finally, we have MRS2iL ≥ MRS3iH in some contract if
δi
(
pL
γ2
α2
+ (1− pH) γ3
α1
)
≥ 1. (21)
5.2 Appendix B: One-Dimensional Heterogeneity
In this appendix, we prove that, even with endogenous wealth accumulation, a model with one-
dimensional heterogeneity in risk only cannot generate equilibria with a negative correlation between
risk and coverage. One-dimensional heterogeneity in risk can be captured within the general frame-
work of Section 2 either by setting niL = niH = 0 for one patience type i or by imposing δL = δH . In
any case, we can omit the patience index i in all expressions and simply refer to individuals as low or
high risks.
Proposition 3. Consider any equilibrium C ′ under one-dimensional heterogeneity in risk only, and
denote by Cj = (βj , dj) the equilibrium contract chosen by risk type j = L,H. Then, βL ≤ βH holds.
Proof. We prove the claim by showing that if βL 6= βH , βL < βH must hold. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We first show that VH(CH) = VH(1, pHD) and dH = pHβHD. By way of contradiction,
suppose first that VH(CH) < VH(1, pHD). Then by continuity of VH there exists a sufficiently small
² > 0 such that contract C = (1, pHD + ²) ∈ C \C ′ still satisfies VH(CH) < VH(C). But then
piC ′∪{C}(C) = x[(pH − pL)D+ ²] +nH² > 0, where x = nL if the low risks prefer C over CL and x = 0
otherwise. This contradicts part (ii) of Definition 2.
Suppose next that VH(CH) > VH(1, pHD). Since βH 6= βL, part (i) of Definition 2 implies that
piC ′(CH) = nH [dH − pHβHD] ≥ 0 must hold. Then, since VH(β, d) is decreasing in d, there exist
an ² ≥ 0 such that contract C = (βH , dH − ²) satisfies dH − ² = pHβHD and VH(CH) ≤ VH(C),
i.e. C is actuarially fair and makes high risks no worse off than CH . Denote by V¯H a high risk’s
utility from contract (1, pHD) when (non-optimal) savings s∗H(βH , dH − ²) are chosen. We then have
VH(CH) ≤ VH(C) ≤ V¯H ≤ VH(1, pHD), where the second inequality holds because concavity of u2
implies that an increase in coverage from βH to 1 together with a fair adjustment of the premium (from
dH − ² to pHD) weakly increases period 2 utility given fixed savings. The third inequality follows from
switching to optimal savings in (1, pHD). But this contradicts the assumption VH(CH) > VH(1, pHD).
Thus VH(CH) = VH(1, pHD) must hold. In addition, dH = pHβHD must be true, since otherwise
a contract C = (βH , dH−²) for some small ² > 0 would satisfy VH(CH) < VH(C) and piC ′∪{C}(C) > 0.
Step 2. We now show that βL ≤ βH . To obtain a contradiction, assume that βH < βL ≤ 1. We
first claim that VH(CH) = VH(C) must then hold for any fair contract C = (β, d) with βH < β < 1
and d = pHβD. Let V¯ ′H denote a high risk’s utility from such a contract C but with (non-optimal)
savings s∗H(βH , dH), and V¯
′′
H the high risk’s utility from (1, pHD) and savings s
∗
H(C). As above,
concavity of u2 then implies VH(CH) ≤ V¯ ′H ≤ VH(C) ≤ V¯ ′′H ≤ VH(1, pHD), which in turn implies
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VH(CH) = VH(C) = VH(1, pHD) and establishes the claim. Second, we claim that CL = (βL, dL) must
actually be such a contract, i.e. satisfy dL = pHβLD. Incentive compatibility VH(CL) ≤ VH(CH) and
βH < βL imply that dL ≥ pHβLD, because of our first claim and because VH is decreasing in d. But
dL > pHβLD is impossible due to the otherwise existence of a profitable deviation contract (βL, dL−²),
which establishes the second claim. Hence VH(CH) = VH(CL), which contradicts βH < βL because
larger coverage is chosen in case of indifference. Therefore, we must have βL ≤ βH , completing the
proof.
5.3 Appendix C: Proofs for the Equilibrium Construction
We prove the proposition in two steps. First, we provide a parameter collection P ∈P (hence satis-
fying Assumption 1) for which indifference curves exhibit the shape depicted in Figure 2. This implies
that C ′ as defined in the proposition indeed satisfies C2 < C3 for the given P (and all contracts in C ′
earn nonnegative profits, which is part (i) in Definition 2). Second, we show that there is no contract
outside of C ′ that would earn strictly positive profits if offered in addition (part (ii) in Definition 2).
The fact that there is an open subset P ′ ⊂P (around P ) for which this argument is applicable then
follows immediately.
Step 1. A collection P ∈ P for which indifference curves exhibit the shape as depicted in Figure
2 is given as follows:
Example Parameters P ∈P
Slopes Kinks Risk & Patience Population
α1 1 c¯1 10 pL 0.6 nHH 0.1
α2 3 c¯2 25 pH 0.65 nLH 0.6
α3 15 c˜1 35.5 D 11 nHL 0.2
γ1 20 c˜2 50 W 67.6 nLL 0.1
γ2 3.5 δL 0.952
γ3 0.9
Table 1.
Given the parameters from Table 1, the relevant indifference curves can be derived analytically or
numerically. We made use of a computer program that first derives the indifference curve of type LH
through contract C1, then calculates the optimal incentive compatible contract C3 for type LL, and
finally contract C3. The resulting slope- and crossing-patterns are as depicted in Figure 2.
Step 2. Figure 4 is a schematic depiction of the equilibrium candidate constructed above (and
illustrated in Figure 2). Specifically, the four types’ indifference curves through their equilibrium
contracts span several regions, which are labelled with numbers from 1 to 10 in Figure 4. To guarantee
that C ′ is an equilibrium, it needs to hold that no contract in any of these regions attracts a profitable
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subset of the population away from C ′. Contracts in regions not labelled with a number can never be
profitable. Either they do not attract any type, or they earn losses irrespective of which individuals
purchase them. In Figure 4, these latter contracts lie below the low risks’ zero profit line (dotted,
lower right corner).
Figure 4: Existence Conditions.
Any contract in region 1, 4 or 8 is preferred only by high risks over their optimal contract from
C ′ and cannot be a profitable deviation. In the graphical illustration in Figure 4, any such contract
lies below the high-risk zero-profit line (dotted, upper left corner). Any contract in region 9 attracts
the individuals who preferred C2 in C ′ and must also earn losses. Graphically, region 9 is below the
zero-profit line for the HL-HH-pool (dotted, in the center). The following table then summarizes for
the remaining regions the set of types that can be attracted away from C ′ by contracts within that
region.
Deviation Contracts in C \C ′
Region 2 3 5 6 7 10
Types LH,LL LH,LL,HH LH,LL,HL LH,HL LH,HH,LL,HL LH,HL,HH
Table 2.
Whether or not there is a profitable deviation can now be checked. For example, no contract (β, d)
in region 2 is allowed to satisfy pi(β, d, nLL, nLH) > 0. This condition can be verified by deriving the
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zero-profit line for the pool consisting of the LL and the LH types, i.e the function
d0LL,LH(β) = β
(
nLLpL + nLHpH
nLL + nLH
)
D.
Indeed it holds that d < d0LL,LH(β) for every contract (β, d) in region 2, which we again verified
computer-based. The conditions for the remaining regions are analogous, and all of them are satisfied.
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